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IMPROVING KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION
THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS ON
COGNITIVE BIASES
Sophie Stammers
Department of Philosophy
University of Birmingham
Abstract. Much of the philosophical debate regarding technological epistemic enhancement concerns
interventions on cognitive capacities that are already performing well in order that they perform even
better. However, several decades of research in cognitive science demonstrates that humans harbor
systematic cognitive biases that can produce ill-grounded, distorted, or otherwise epistemically faulty
cognitions. Such cognitions can be stubborn and so may be good candidates for reduction or elimination
through technological intervention. In this article, Sophie Stammers demonstrates that we can take
two approaches in such an endeavor: interventions that halt and redirect the general processes that can
generate biased cognitions; and targeted interventions that aim to extinguish or overwrite individual
biased cognitions. Stammers argues that, because the general processes that produce biased cognitions
also regularly produce accurate cognitions, an intervention that halts these processes altogether will
have the result that the person undergoing the intervention will find it difficult to form new beliefs and
acquire further knowledge, an epistemically undesirable outcome. Targeted interventions are therefore
preferable because they enable us to eliminate some biases, while leaving otherwise useful processes
(such as heuristics) intact. She concludes by demonstrating that our epistemic goals will be best achieved
when targeted technological interventions are supplemented by attention to relevant structural features.
Introduction
Discussion of both the possibility and desirability of using technological devel-
opments to enhance human performance in a variety of domains occupies theorists
across a wide range of disciplines. A subset of these technologies aims to enhance
the process of knowledge acquisition (“epistemic enhancement,” to use JohnDana-
her’s term), raising important questions for both educational theorists and practi-
tioners.1 Much of the philosophical debate regarding technological enhancement in
the epistemic realm concerns interventions on cognitive capacities that are already
performing well in order that they perform even better.2 These discussions are
about extending the boundaries of human performance. However, several decades
of research in cognitive science demonstrates that humans harbor systematic cog-
nitive biases that can produce ill-grounded, distorted, or otherwise epistemically
faulty cognitions. These biases have a range of deleterious effects on multiple
aspects of both teaching and learning. While philosophers have discussed the pos-
sibility and permissibility of technological epistemic enhancement of cognitive
capacities that are already performing well, whether technological interventions
might be used to mitigate cognitive biases is underexplored.3
1. John Danaher, “On the Need for Epistemic Enhancement: Democratic Legitimacy and the Enhance-
ment Project,” Law, Innovation, and Technology 5, no. 1 (2013): 85–112.
2. See, for example, Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics,
Regulatory Challenges,” Science and Engineering Ethics 15, no. 3 (2009): 311–341.
3. Discussion of technological interventions that play an ameliorative role has tended to focus on
therapeutic applications — the use of propanol to reduce anxiety, for example — that may have indirect
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In this article, I investigate the use of future technological interventions to
mitigate the effects of cognitive bias in education. I first consider current research
that may pave the way for future technological cognitive interventions (section 1).
I then introduce cognitive bias (section 2) and focus on two examples, confirma-
tion bias (2.1) and social bias (2.2), and justify why these are of particular concern in
educational settings. In section 3, I demonstrate that we can take two approaches
to addressing such biases through technological cognitive interventions: (a) inter-
ventions that halt and redirect the processes that generate biased cognitions; and
(b) targeted interventions that aim to extinguish or overwrite individual biased
cognitions. I argue that, because the processes that produce biased cognitions also
regularly produce accurate cognitions, an intervention that halts these processes
altogether will have the result that the person undergoing the intervention will
find it difficult to form new beliefs and acquire further knowledge, an epistemi-
cally undesirable outcome. Targeted interventions are therefore preferable because
they enable us to eliminate some biases while, at the same time, leaving often use-
ful heuristic processes intact. However, such interventions could have the result
of obscuring information regarding social and historical injustices that, in part,
explain differential achievements — information that is of vital import to effec-
tive teaching, for example, because it contextualizes and justifies the provision
of support. I suggest that interventions that enable the selective erasure of social
biases should invite the user to consider the wider social and historical context
of these biases and should demonstrate how this facilitates progress in research
and also enhances the dissemination of knowledge in teaching and learning more
generally.
1. Kinds of Technological Epistemic Enhancement
Interventions with numerous different kinds of technologies may result
in enhanced cognition that facilitates knowledge acquisition. The locus of inter-
est in this section is not necessarily with technology that produces a distinctive
form of technologically enhanced cognition. My concern is with identifying tech-
nological interventions that are reasonably novel, meaning that they have not been
epistemic benefits by making a person more comfortable in a learning environment; or the use of
central nervous system stimulants to improve attention in learning environments for people with ADHD
(Lawrence H. Diller, “The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimulant Treatment in the
1990s,” Hastings Center Report 25, no. 2 [1996]: 12–18.) There is less discussion of whether individuals
could, and should, employ technological interventions to improve their systematically faulty cognition,
regardless of whether they are neurotypical or not. One exception is the work Laura Klaming and Anton
Vedder have done regarding the possibility of technological enhancement in the case of eyewitness
testimony and memory. See Laura Klaming and Anton Vedder, “Brushing Up Our Memories: Can We
Use Neurotechnologies to Improve Eyewitness Testimony?,” Law, Innovation, and Technology 1, no.
2 (2009): 203–221; and “Human Enhancement and the Common Good: Using Neurotechnologies to
Improve Eyewitness Memory,” AJOB Neuroscience 1, no. 3 (2010): 22–33.
SOPHIE STAMMERS is a Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham,
ERI Building, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, United Kingdom; e-mail <s.stammers@bham.ac.uk>.
Her research interests include implicit cognition and confabulation.
Stammers Technological Interventions on Cognitive Biases 677
traditionally or commonly used and that the theoretical implications of their use
have not been extensively examined.4 In the following, I discuss two interventions
of particular relevance to cognitive bias mitigation that may emerge with consid-
erable technological advances. These are technologies of a futuristic neuroscience,
but we should not delay debate about their desirability for bias mitigation until
they are fully developed: that conversation is worth having now.
1.1 Interfacing Cognitive Processes with Computers
Many forms of interfacing with computers with a view to enhancing cognition
are reasonably mundane and commonplace: in fact, I am engaging in one such case
of interfacing right now, by arranging and rearranging threads of sentences using a
word processing programwith the aim of developing the structure of my argument,
a process that would be much more arduous on paper. All sorts of computer
and smart phone applications provide potential interfacing opportunities that can
facilitate and enhance cognition. However, those who think proper interfacing
requires an especially tight connection — preferably between neural networks
and silicon circuits — will be pleased to hear that researchers are making some
relevant inroads on that front. One avenue of research demonstrates that implants
can read neural signals so that a computer program may visualize the activity of
the neural network in question.5 Researchers are still some way from interpreting
the content of representations across the network, but some envisage being able
to do this one day.6 It is conceivable, then, that the connection between mind and
computer could become seamless, with the possibility that cognition is enhanced
significantly through this direct integration with software.
1.2 Direct Neural Manipulation
Various forms of direct neural manipulation feature prominently in science
fiction. For instance, in the film The Matrix, one of the characters directly
“downloads” the know-how required to pilot a helicopter.7 Meanwhile, Eternal
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind features technology that enables people who have
suffered heartbreak in a relationship to locate and delete all of their memories of
the lover who broke their heart.8 Such technology, at least as regards the breadth
4. This concern is shared by others; see, for example, Bostrom and Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement,”
312–313.
5. See Miguel Nicolelis et al., in “Chronic, Multisite, Multielectrode Recordings in Macaque Monkeys,”
Proceedings of theAcademy of Sciences of theUnited States of America 100, no. 19 (2003): 11041–11046;
see also Jose Carmena et al., “Learning to Control a Brain–Machine Interface for Reaching and Grasping
by Primates,” PLoSBiology 1, no. 2 (2003): 193–208.
6. Miguel Nicolelis and Sidarta Ribeiro contemplate this in “Multielectrode Recordings: The Next
Steps,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 12, no. 5 (2002): 602–606.
7. The Matrix, film, directed by the Wachowski Brothers (Burbank, CA: Warner Bros, 1999).
8. Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, film, directed by Michel Gondri (New York: Focus Features,
2004).
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and accuracy possible in interventions of this sort, is still a long way off. But
that doesn’t mean that the implications of such interventions are not worthy of
discussion.Moreover, recent developments in neuroscience suggest the beginnings
of what Jiangyuan Hu calls “selective erasure,” whichmay be of particular interest
for our purposes in this article9 By blocking a specific protein, Hu and colleagues
were able to reverse particular kinds of associations formed in memory. Further
research led by Dheeraj Roy demonstrates that lost memories can be reconstructed
by manipulating engram cells (suspected sites of memory storage).10 It is worth
noting that the subjects in Hu et al.’s study were snails, while those in Roy et al.’s
study were mice. However, both groups of researchers are confident that their
respective methods could, in the future, be employed by humans, particularly
in therapeutic applications (for treating anxiety or post-traumatic stress disorder,
and Alzheimer’s Disease respectively). We will discuss the implications of these
findings in more detail in section 3.
Let us now turn our attention to some systematically epistemically faulty
cognitions that these interventions may serve to improve.
2. Cognitive Bias and Knowledge Acquisition
Cartesian views in which our perceptual and cognitive systems typically repre-
sent reality as it is have generally fallen out of favor.11 For some, this undermines
the possibility of any accurate representation,12 although others have countered
this view, arguing that cognitive heuristics that result in some biased judgments
develop for the reason that they deliver accurate representations overall.13
There is no commonly agreed upon definition of cognitive bias. This is perhaps
because there is much discussion over what it means for a cognition to be “biased.”
To be biased is to deviate from some prescribed (set of) norms(s), but which set of
norms is at issue is hotly debated.14 For this reason, I prefer the definition offered
by Martie Haselton and colleagues: it considers biases distortions of objective
reality, without pronouncing on which norms they violate. According to Haselton
et al., cognitive biases are “cases in which human cognition reliably produces
9. Jiangyuan Hu et al., “Selective Erasure of Distinct Forms of Long-Term Synaptic Plasticity Underlying
Different Forms of Memory in the Same Postsynaptic Neuron,” Current Biology 27, no. 13 (2017):
1888–1899.
10. Dheeraj Roy et al., “Memory Retrieval by Activating Engram Cells in Mouse Models of Early
Alzheimer’s Disease,” Nature 531, no. 7595 (2016): 508–512.
11. See Andy Clark, Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2016).
12. See, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weisheimer and Donald G.
Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1989).
13. See, for example, GerdGigerenzer andWolfgangGaissmaier in “Heuristic DecisionMaking,”Annual
Review of Psychology 62, no. 1 (2011): 451–482.
14. For discussion, see Andrea Polonioli, “Adaptive Rationality, Biases, and the Heterogeneity Hypoth-
esis,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7, no. 4 (2016): 787–803.
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representations that are systematically distorted compared to some aspect of
objective reality.”15 Cognitive biases also affect how humans seek, interpret, and
form judgments about incoming information, resulting in further distortions.16
Let us turn to two commonly recognized types of cognitive bias: confirmation
bias (2.1) and social bias (2.2). I show why each is of particular relevance to
educational settings and justify the need to discuss whether and how we should
eliminate them through technological interventions should the possibility arise.
2.1 Confirmation Bias
People are more likely to search for, and to accept, information that conforms
with their existing beliefs and hypotheses than that which contradicts them. This
tendency alone might not always deliver distorted cognitions or distortion of the
relevant features of the decision environment: If one’s existing beliefs correspond
with reality, accepting information that coheres with these may well result in the
adoption of beliefs that do correspond with reality. However, most of us will,
in many circumstances, harbor some beliefs that do not correspond with reality or,
at least, that do not capture all of the relevant factors in a decision environment.
In these cases, confirmation bias is apt to shape our thinking.17
Confirmation bias threatens learning in disciplines concerned with how things
are in the world and that center on creating models that correspond with reality
(for example, the sciences and humanities). Take, for example, belief in the
reality of anthropogenic climate change. The only considerations that ought to
determine whether humans are causing increasing global temperatures and a
changing climate are climate data. However, it turns out that existing political
beliefs play a role in whether people accept the existence of anthropogenic climate
change. People who are politically conservative are significantly more likely to
believe that anthropogenic climate change is not happening.18 The effect is present
in those with increased levels of science comprehension,19 and is even seen
among (non–climate) scientists,20 meaning that not just learners, but, potentially,
15. Martie G. Haselton, Daniel Nettle, and Paul W. Andrews, “The Evolution of Cognitive Bias,” in The
Handbook for Evolutionary Psychology, ed. David M. Buss (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2005), 968.
16. For discussion of different cognitive biases, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
17. Raymond Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,” Review of
General Psychology 2, no. 2 (1998): 175–220.
18. Aaron M. McCright and Riley E. Dunlap, “The Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in
the American Public’s Views of Global Warming, 2001–2010,” Sociological Quarterly 52, no. 2 (2011):
155–194.
19. DanM. Kahan et al., “The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy andNumeracy on Perceived Climate
Change Risks,” Nature Climate Change 2, no. 10 (2012): 732–735.
20. J. Stuart Carlton et al., “The Climate Change Consensus Extends beyond Climate Scientists,”
Environmental Research Letters 10, no. 9 (2015): 94025.
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educators (assuming at least some of the scientists in question also have teaching
duties) are susceptible to confirmation biases in their practice.
Confirmation bias in the above instance has been explained in part by people’s
motivation to avoid inconsistency: people who are politically conservative tend to
support free-market economics and are averse to market restrictions on commodi-
ties like fossil fuels. However, it is uncomfortable to admit that one champions
something that has harmful results, and more comfortable to reject the existence
of the harms in question. The risk that our values might determine, in part, which
information we find persuasive and credible presents considerable risk to many
aspects of education (including primary, secondary, further, and higher education):
from determining the content included (and omitted) from curricula (for example,
omitting meaningful study of colonialism from UK history curricula because it
does not cohere with one’s notion of British values); to the evaluation of student
work and provision of feedback (heavymarking workloads entail considerable time
pressure, which increases cognitive load — ideal conditions for the manifestation
of biases such as confirmation bias). As such, if we are interested in providing rig-
orous, comprehensive, and applicable educational experiences, we ought to look
into mitigating confirmation bias.
2.2 Social Bias
People who profess to having egalitarian commitments, and who do not intend
to discriminate, have nonetheless been shown to make unfavorable judgments
about a person and/or his or her accomplishments on the basis of that person’s
social group membership. Researchers explain these findings by proposing that
we tend to associate certain social identity groups with certain stereotypical
traits and, further, that these associations can manifest in cognition and lead us
to misrepresent people by expecting them to comply with a stereotype that does
not necessarily reflect reality.
Researchers have described these as implicit social biases, although there is
much discussion regarding exactly what is implicit about them, as well as how
they are best measured.21 Social biases arise in a variety of teaching and learning
environments.22 They are of particular relevance to educational theorists and
practitioners, from an epistemic perspective, because they cause us to discount the
scholarly contributions of people who do not fit the social stereotype associated
21. For an overview of the controversy surrounding (some) measurement paradigms, see Jesse Singal,
“Psychology’s Favorite Tool for Measuring Racism Isn’t Up to the Job,” The Cut (New York Magazine),
January 11, 2017, http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2017/01/psychologys-racism-measuring-tool-isnt-up-
to-the-job.html); and for a series of responses reinstating the existence of social bias and the need to
combat it, see John Schwenkler, “What Can We Learn from the Implicit Association Test? A Brains Blog
Roundtable,” The Brains Blog, January 17, 2017, http://philosophyofbrains.com/2017/01/17/how-can-
we-measure-implicit-bias-a-brains-blog-roundtable.aspx.
22. Guy Boysen and David Vogel, “Bias in the Classroom: Types, Frequencies, and Responses,” Teaching
of Psychology 36, no. 1 (2009): 12–17; and Cheryl Staats, “Understanding Implicit Bias: What Educators
Should Know,” American Educator 39, no. 4 (2015–2016): 29–43.
Stammers Technological Interventions on Cognitive Biases 681
with their field of knowledge, which could lead to distorted representations of
academic progress in that field.
According to one study, for example, people evaluate an error-ridden piece of
writing less favorably when they believe it was written by an African American
person compared to when they think the author is white.23 In this study,
researchers presented participants with writings that were identical except for the
name of the author, sometimes using names commonly associated with African
American people, and sometimes using names commonly associated with white
people. They found that participants perceivedmanuscripts by (apparently) African
American authors as less accurate than those by (apparently) white authors.
Researchers maintain that seeing the author’s name activates racial stereotypes
that distort participants’ perception of the manuscript’s quality. Effects like these
are important to educational theorists and practitioners in light of evidence that
there is a larger attainment gap between ethnic minority and non–minority stu-
dents in classes taught by educators who demonstrate a higher degree of implicit
prejudice versus those taught by educators with lower levels of implicit preju-
dice.24 Devaluing intellectual contribution on the basis of social group member-
ship is also shown to occur in academic research. One study demonstrated that
university faculty across 259 institutions were more likely to reply to emails pur-
porting to be from students requesting mentoring on a future research project
if the email appeared to come from a white man rather than from a woman
and/or ethnic minority correspondent.25 Again, the researchers conducting this
study kept the email content fixed, changing only the name of the sender. In
another case, a journal showed a significant increase in the publication of arti-
cles by female authors following the introduction of double-blind review, in which
the social identity of the author is unknown to those involved in the edito-
rial process.26 Taken together, these studies seem to confirm that bias leads to
a discounting of cognitive contributions at least partially on the basis of social
group membership. Such implicit social bias undermines our pursuit of knowl-
edge, particularly when these contributions, if given appropriate credence, have
the potential to further human inquiry and extend our understanding of the
world.
23. Arin N. Reeves, “Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions
of Writing Skills” (Chicago: Nextions Yellow Paper Series, 2014), http://nextions.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/written-in-black-and-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf.
24. Linda van den Bergh et al., “The Implicit Prejudiced Attitudes of Teachers: Relations to Teacher
Expectations and the Ethnic Achievement Gap,” American Education Research Journal 47, no. 2 (2010):
497–527.
25. Katherine Milkman et al., “What Happens Before? A Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and
Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway into Organizations,” Journal of Applied
Psychology 100, no. 6 (2015): 1678–1712.
26. Amber Budden et al., “Double-Blind Review Favors Increased Representation of Female Authors,”
Trends in Ecology and Evolution 23, no. 1 (2008): 4–6.
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2.3 Good Candidates for Technological Intervention
There is much discussion over exactly how the cognitions involved in the
biases discussed in the preceding sections should be characterized. Theorists
sometimes identify them as unconscious, suggesting that we are unaware that the
relevant judgments are distorted by cognitive biases, taking our attitudes to cor-
respond well with reality. However, research suggests that in some circumstances
people might become aware of the influence of a bias on their behavior.27 Thus, it
might be better to think of them as typically unnoticed, but potentially available
upon reflection. Recognition of bias in one’s attitudes does not guarantee that a
person will successfully overwrite the biased cognition immediately or prevent its
influence in reasoning, however. Such biases are typically difficult to control;28 at
the very least, they require reasonably effortful strategies to be brought under con-
trol.29 Furthermore, as Lisa Bortolotti demonstrates, we have a tendency to believe
we are reasoning well, even when confronted with inconsistencies in our cogni-
tion. Bortolotti draws upon on a range of studies demonstrating our tendencies
toward preference reversal and decision procedure variation.30 For instance, alter-
ing whether one and the same disease management program is described in terms
of lives saved as opposed to lives lost alters peoples’ endorsement of that program.31
However, evidence suggests that people can be very resistant to changing their posi-
tion when confronted about their preference variability and other inconsistencies
in these sorts of decisions.32
That recognition and control of bias requires effort and persistence does not
mean that that people should not be expected to make the relevant efforts to bring
biased cognition under control (as Jules Holroyd and Daniel Kelly argue).33 Still,
it seems appropriate to inquire as to whether any other strategies might make
the process easier and more effective, and thus to turn our attention to whether
technological interventions could help out.
Before moving on to the next section, it is worth outlining the scope of my
argument and acknowledging other issues that I do not have space to address
27. See studies from Margo Monteith et al., “Taking a Look Underground: Detecting, Interpreting, and
Reacting to Implicit Racial Biases,” Social Cognition 19, no. 4 (2001): 395–417; and AdamHahn, Charles
M. Judd, Holen J. Hirsch, and Irene V. Blair, “Awareness of Implicit Attitudes,” Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General 143, no. 3 (2014): 1369–1392; and discussion by Jules Holroyd, “Implicit Bias,
Awareness, and Imperfect Cognitions,” Consciousness and Cognition 33 (May 2015): 511–523.
28. Neil Levy, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
29. Jules Holroyd and Daniel Kelly, “Implicit Bias, Character, and Control,” in From Personality to
Virtue, ed. Alberto Masala and Jonathan Webber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
30. Lisa Bortolotti, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
chap. 2.
31. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,”
Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–458.
32. Bortolotti, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs, 87.
33. Holroyd and Kelly, “Implicit Bias, Character, and Control.”
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in this article, but that have been explored more fully elsewhere. As previously
highlighted, I am interested in why we might be motivated to investigate techno-
logical interventions on cognitive biases from an epistemic perspective — that is,
in order to improve the process of knowledge acquisition and sharing in educational
settings. This raises the question of the sense in which people are thereby obligated
to utilize technological interventions when available in educational settings and
invites a discussion of consent. For the purposes of this article, I will assume that
consent from the individual undergoing the intervention would be a requirement
for proceeding.34 It is consistent with exploring technological interventions on cog-
nitive biases from an epistemic perspective that other concerns (for example, those
from a moral perspective) might independently motivate this investigation, but I
will not consider those here.35
Others have cautioned that because novel technologies intended for enhanc-
ing any human capacity will come at some financial cost, their use will introduce
unfair advantages for those able to afford these interventions, thereby disadvantag-
ing those who cannot. I follow others in seeing these issues as symptomatic of a
general problem of unfair resource distribution that is perpetuated under dominant
economic systems rather than a particular issue for novel technological interven-
tions.36 While there is only space here to recommend technological interventions
from an epistemic perspective, someone taking forward these recommendations
would want to consider these practical issues more fully.
3. Epistemic Considerations for Technological Interventions
on Cognitive Biases
In this section, I demonstrate that there are two ways in which we might
use technology to intervene on cognitive biases, and then assess the desirability
of these interventions for facilitating knowledge acquisition. The first kind of inter-
vention acts on the processes that produce distorted representations. The second
acts on individual representations. We will consider them in that order.
3.1 Halting Biased Processes
Recall the discussion from section 1 in which technologies of a future neuro-
science can interpret and interact with the representation of information across a
neural network. This might occur via sophisticated neural-interfacing implants (as
34. One might argue that the same considerations that obligate people in positions of power (for
example, employers) to take implicit bias training might also obligate their use of novel technological
interventions, and that this also applies to educators. But a fuller discussion would be necessary before
proceeding.
35. For a discussion of using technological enhancement to extend our moral capacities, see Julian
Savulescu and Ingmar Persson, “The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to
Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2008): 162–177.
36. For discussion, see Bostrom and Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement.”
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in 1.1) that are able to scan the network’s activity at a fine enough grain that soft-
ware interfacing with the network can decode the representations and processes
running on it. Let’s also suppose that the interfacing device is able to manipulate
representations and to halt, redirect, or initiate processes (as in 1.2).37 Now, we can
program our software to detect any process on the network that has resulted in a
distorted representation (such as when the network utilizes a heuristic, or jumps
to a conclusion that isn’t properly supported by other representations in the net-
work) and, via the interface, redirect the network to run processes that will result
in a nondistorted representation instead.
Call the intervention described above the “Heuristic Terminator.” By inter-
vening, halting, and redirecting the processes which generate cognitive biases,
the Heuristic Terminator ensures that the neural network will not produce the
distorted representations which, as we saw above, can thwart our acquisition of
knowledge. Use of the Heuristic Terminator would thereby significantly enhance
knowledge acquisition in a person who previously demonstrated a typical degree
of cognitive bias, enabling them to avoid the distorted cognitions discussed in
section 2.
In principle, this all sounds good. However, once we start thinking more
about how the Heuristic Terminator’s software would work, together with the
limitations of the existing “wet-ware,” we run into some trouble. As we saw in
2.1, heuristic reasoning does not always result in distorted cognition. Sometimes it
leads to further beliefs that do correspond with reality. Thus, it is not the case that
terminating any heuristic process will kill off all and only the distorted cognitions.
It may also result in the extinction of accurate representations.
It will be helpful at this point to consider why we tend to rely on heuristics
and other cognitive shortcuts in the first place. Human information processing
capacities are limited, but the information in our environment that is possibly
relevant to cognition is extensive and far outweighs our processing capacity. Using
heuristics enables us to more easily identify information that might be relevant
and, moreover, enables us to terminate inquiry without having to consider every
possibly relevant piece of information. It is likely that a vast quantity of human
information processing relies on heuristics.38
It is unclear whether the Heuristic Terminator could differentiate a heuristic
that typically delivers accurate cognitions from one that does not. If its instruction
to the neural network is to terminate all heuristic processes and to demand that
all representations are arrived at in a way that guarantees their reliability, then we
might end up with a system that simply stops forming any further representations
because the threshold for establishing an accurate representation of the world is
37. We do not yet have a story to tell about the details here, but, as suggested in section 1, we should
not have to wait for an innovation to be available before debating whether — and how — it is worth
utilizing.
38. See Thomas Gilovich et al., eds., Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), for a series of essays on this topic.
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too high to be met with existing cognitive resources. In that scenario, one would
regularly find oneself unable to form new beliefs. So, interfacing with the Heuristic
Terminator would likely be a rather uncomfortable and disorientating experience.
We have not arrived at a place where knowledge acquisition is facilitated — quite
the opposite. The Heuristic Terminator has created the ultimate skeptic.
It might be suggested that if the problem is that human processing capacities
are limited, then the solution is to use the Heuristic Terminator in conjunction
with another technological intervention that significantly augments processing
capacity. This could occur through further interfacing in which processing is
offloaded from the low-capacity wetware and distributed across a much higher
capacity artificial processor. Then, we would have a substantially upgraded pro-
cessor to support the operations necessary for forming accurate representations
without relying on heuristic processes.
Using this intervention, we would be able to form new beliefs while avoiding
cognitive biases. However, onemight nowwonder exactly howmuch human is left
in this extensive labyrinth of interfacing.39 Suffice to say, this option constitutes
a somewhat radical enhancement. It might be that in the future, humans will
regularly use interfaces for a range of applications, and so this proposal will be
more mundane for them than it seems to us now. Still there is another concern:
the solution we have created here is rather inelegant. In ensuring that cognitive
biases do not arise in the system, we have had to remove a significant part of what
the system does well, only to bolt on a nonhuman module to meet the demand
necessary to replicate those epistemically useful processes. Perhaps there is a less
roundabout — and less radical — way to achieve the same effects.
3.2 Targeted Interventions
If heuristic processes in general bring epistemic benefits as well as costs, then
perhaps a better arrangement than theHeuristic Terminator is an intervention that
targets just those representations which, when recruited in processing, typically
result in distorted cognitions. In fact, some cognitive scientists employ current
technological interventions with the aim of achieving this targeted effect. A canon-
ical example comes from a pioneer of research into implicit cognition, Mahzarin
Banaji, who has made a screensaver that cycles through a thousand pictures
of counterstereotypical images of people, with twomain aims: (a) to combat stereo-
typical associations between concepts that are overemphasized by biased sources
(for example, a media that overemphasizes the association between black people
and criminality);40 and (b) to give her access to representations of people and their
39. It might be thought that the discovery that heuristics are embedded in our cognition already
undermines the essence of human thought, but it is not clear that this follows: it has been argued that
such processes are, in fact, fundamental to interpreting our experiences and to building our understanding
of the world (see, for example, Gadamer, Truth and Method).
40. A report on representations of blackmen in themedia by theOpportunity Agenda found that negative
associations tend to be exaggerated, while positive associations tend to be limited. The Opportunity
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life experiences beyond the scope of her normal perspective. Her intention is that
(a) enables her cognitive system to gradually uncouple stereotypical associations;
while (b) allows her to instill new representations about people she would other-
wise know little about, so that she is less likely to rely on inaccurate stereotypes of
their life and experiences.41 Speaking of these sorts of interventions, Banaji says, “I
no longer believe that I can just let information intomymind as it comes. I believe I
must choose and edit.… I actually am pleased that the way technology now allows
me to craft what I want to watch and listen to.”42 It has been pointed out that these
sorts of interventions require continued effort and, even then, may not rid some-
one completely of a distorted representation. Neil Levy maintains that it remains
“controversial” as to whether interventions like those suggested by Banaji enable
the overwriting of distortions in a manner that is “relatively rapid” or “arduous,
slow and extremely uncertain.”43 So, one might be interested in whether future
technologies may enhance this effortful and uncertain process.
As introduced in 1.4, Hu and colleagues’ developments in “selective erasure,”
which aim to target particular associations in memory, might be the basis of
one such intervention. As before, we can imagine that we are operating under
a somewhat futuristic neuroscience, in which neural manipulation technology
can search for specific associations between concepts, and can then selectively
erase them, leaving accurate information regarding the concepts in question intact.
Let’s also imagine that our intervention is able to overwrite or implant new
representations (as in Roy et al., also discussed in 1.4). Call this intervention the
“Selective Manipulator.” Let’s now consider how it might work.
Recall, Reeves’s findings that people judge one and the same piece of writing to
bemore error-riddenwhen they believe it to have beenwritten by anAfrican Amer-
ican person rather than by a white person.44 By selectively erasing the association
linking African Americans and academic underachievement, the Selective Manip-
ulator could prevent distorted judgments of the accuracy of writing perceived to
be by African Americans from occurring in this case. The Selective Manipulator
could also be used to target associations between women and academic under-
achievement to prevent the kind of distorted judgments discussed in section 2.2.45
Agenda, “Social Science Literature Review: Media Representation and Impact on Lives of Black Men
and Boys” (NewYork: The Opportunity Agenda, 2011), 13–14, http://racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/
Media-Impact-onLives-of-Black-Men-and-Boys-OppAgenda.pdf.
41. This technique was used in Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald, “On the Malleability of
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individu-
als,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 5 (2001): 800–814.
42. Interview of Mahzarin Banaji, “The Mind Is a Difference-Seeking Machine,” On Being with Krista
Tippett (podcast), June 9, 2016, https://onbeing.org/programs/mahzarin-banaji-the-mind-is-a-difference-
seeking-machine-aug2018/.
43. Levy, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, 99.
44. Reeves, “Written in Black & White.”
45. Those revealed inMilkman et al., “What Happens Before?”; and Budden et al., “Double-Blind Review
Favors Increased Representation of Female Authors.”
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The Selective Manipulator will be useful when it enables the deletion of a
biased association that might otherwise become active in cognition to produce
biased judgments. For instance, consider two teachers who harbor an association
between the conceptsmale and rationalitywho are grading the quality of students’
arguments. For the teacher whose association remains intact, that association is
apt to distort their perception of argument quality (leading them to mark one and
the same argument as of a higher quality when they believe it was written by a boy
as compared to a girl), while this risk is removed for the teacher whose association
has been selectively deleted. One might think that simply anonymizing student
work produces the same result, but knowing who produced which piece of work
while marking is pedagogically valuable, for it enables teachers to tailor the tone of
their feedback (some students do better with frank, straightforward feedback, but
for others this tone is not constructive).
We have so far considered associations between social identity and particular
aptitudes. But what about cases in which teachers favor contributions that reflect
the dominant culture and undervalue contributions that support nondominant
cultures? For instance, in a politics class, a student raised with Western values,
with an emphasis on individualism, might praise the individualistic aspects of a
political system, while a student raised in a culture that places more emphasis
on collectivism might criticize those aspects of a political system, and a Western
teacher might unfairly undervalue the second student’s contribution. While there
is much empirical work on how associations regarding dominant social identity
categories bias cognition, there is less on how dominant ideologies produce
bias in cognition, and so it would be premature to make any claim regarding
how the Selective Manipulator would work in these cases. If it turns out that
dominant ideologies are, like social stereotypes, upheld through a series of discrete
evaluations (in which, for example, facets of individualism are positively valanced
while those of collectivism are negatively valanced), then it is possible that these
may also be targeted by the Selective Manipulator. It could be that there is less
public agreement on whether these cases count as bias because they may well
be viewed through the lens of the dominant ideology; therefore, communication
around such cases would need to be handled with care. But public pushback against
current de-biasing efforts is common, and managing this is another practical issue
to be considered before using the Selective Manipulator.46
Not everyone may support the use of the Selective Manipulator. For instance,
those who espouse the “mirror view” of the above attitudes might object that
this use of the Selective Manipulator will not have the intended epistemically
beneficial outcomes. According to the mirror view, social biases are not really
biases at all, but reflect real-life propensities. Nilanjana Dasgupta, for instance,
suggests that implicit attitudes are “mirror-like reflections of local environments
and communities within which individuals are immersed,” and that “[t]hrough
repetition, these observations get passively recorded in the mind and become
46. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to consider these sorts of cases.
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the basis of implicit attitudes and beliefs.”47 For instance, African Americans
do underachieve in some educational settings as compared with white people,
and it is this fact that causes an association with underachievement, but social,
economic, and political factors (such as reduced access to education and financial
resources) explain this underachievement.48 Nonetheless, for proponents of the
mirror view, reality is reflected in a cognition that links African Americans
with underachievement.49 Following the mirror view, Tamar Szabó Gendler has
argued that implicit social attitudes aren’t really biases at all because they reflect
real-world propensities and, further, that in rejecting them, one loses important
accurate representations of the world.50 If this is right, then from an epistemic
point of view, these cognitions ought to be preserved after all.
However, a number of other philosophers have argued that the situation is
more nuanced than the mirror view would have it. Alex Madva, for instance,
maintains that the mirror view is “a radically oversimplified and misleading gloss
on the psychology of prejudice,” pointing to evidence that our social representa-
tions of the world are partly reinforced and maintained by the way we want to see
the world.51 For instance, one study shows that men were more critical of findings
indicating a bias against hiring women in science, while women were more
critical of findings indicating an absence of such a bias.52 In short, confirmation
bias, driven by the desire to, for instance, downplay the structural benefits that
have given one advantages over members of another group, feeds and maintains
our implicit social biases.
Further, one might hold something like a mirror view of implicit associa-
tions, but argue that use of the Selective Manipulator is nevertheless epistem-
ically recommended. Katherine Puddifoot maintains that even if our implicit
social attitudes do reflect real-world propensities (for example, associating science
with men simply because there are more prominent male scientists than female
47. Nilanjana Dasgupta, “Implicit Attitudes and Beliefs Adapt to Situations: A Decade of Research on
the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice, Stereotypes, and the Self-Concept,” Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology 47 (2013): 240–241.
48. Indeed, Tyrone Howard demonstrates both this differential achievement and that multiple factors
(including the prejudiced attitudes and differential treatment by educators) account for these findings, in
“Who Really Cares? The Disenfranchisement of African AmericanMales in PreK–12 Schools: A Critical
Race Theory Perspective,” Teachers College Record 110, no. 5 (2008): 954–985.
49. See also Sally Haslanger, “Social Structure, Narrative, and Explanation,” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 45, no. 1 (2015): 1–15.
50. Tamar Szabó Gendler, “On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias,” Philosophical Studies 156, no. 1
(2011): 33–63.
51. Alex Madva, “A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social
Policy,” Ergo 3, no. 27 (2016): 719. These motivations might be unconscious, or at least relatively
unreflective, and available only through careful self-observation.
52. Ian Handley et al., “Quality of Evidence Revealing Subtle Gender Biases in Science Is in the Eye of
the Beholder,” National Academy of Sciences 112, no. 43 (2015): 13201–13206, cited in Madva, “A Plea
for Anti-Anti-Individualism,” 719.
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scientists), their tendency to feature in so much other processing that results in
further distorted cognition outweighs the epistemic benefit of reflecting real-world
propensities.53 For instance, an association between black people and under-
achievement may reflect reality, but it is apt to be activated automatically by
stimuli evoking black people and to generate distorted judgments in instances
where this association should not have any normative force. Even if it is true that
black people tend to underperform in some academic pursuits compared with peo-
ple from other racial backgrounds, that is not a reason for seeing more errors in one
and the same piece of writing when it is associatedwith a black author compared to
a white author — and yet, that is what people believe they see, constituting a real
risk for perpetuating stereotypes in educational settings.54 For this reason, Puddi-
foot argues, the epistemic benefits of maintaining the association are outweighed
by these downstream epistemic costs, and so we would do better epistemically if
we rejected the association. Accordingly, the epistemic considerations that moti-
vate the mirror view (reflecting reality) may still be compatible with the use of the
Selective Manipulator.
While I am convinced by Madva’s and Puddifoot’s arguments that the epis-
temic characteristics of implicit biases are not exhausted by pointing to the ways
in which they reflect society, I am also sympathetic to a concern raised by many
who espouse the mirror view: that the relevant social stereotypes are connected to
deep and pervasive structural issues that we should not lose sight of in discussions
of cognitive bias.55 This concern may well count against the use of the Selective
Manipulator as a method to extinguish implicit social biases in favor of advanc-
ing learning — or, at least, it requires that the Manipulator be used in conjunction
with other resources to mitigate this potential. If the Selective Manipulator allows
users to effectively delete their biases without acknowledging their content, their
source, or their part in perpetuating structural injustices, then it takes away an
important opportunity to engage learners and educators with the aim of facilitat-
ing their recognition of the structures that constrain the trajectories of knowledge
acquisition.
Consider again Reeves’s finding that a piece of writing is evaluated more
harshly when participants believe the author is African American than when
they think the author is white.56 In these sorts of judgments, the manifestation
of the association is inappropriate, but participants harbor this association in
53. Katherine Puddifoot, “Dissolving the Epistemic/Ethical Dilemma over Implicit Bias,” Philosophical
Explorations 20, sup. 1 (2017): 73–93.
54. Reeves, “Written in Black & White.”
55. Haslanger, “Social Structure, Narrative, and Explanation.” There is disagreement about the nature
of the connection: those who espouse the mirror view think injustice in the structure of society is
primarily responsible for the formation of stereotypes in cognition, while some respondents to themirror
view (including Madva) think that there is feedback, with the cognitive stereotypes reinforcing unjust
structures, and those structures reinforcing the stereotypes.
56. Reeves, “Written in Black & White.”
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part because African American students generally do underachieve in compari-
son with white peers — yet, this attainment gap exists due to historical struc-
tural injustices that deprive African American communities of resources nec-
essary to develop academic success.57 The association itself does not contain
information about the historical structural injustice that explains the achieve-
ment differential. Nevertheless, confronting the fact that one harbors negative
associations about African Americans presents an opportunity to deepen one’s
understanding of these structural issues. This could prove particularly important
for teachers. In this case, it contextualizes and justifies the provision of support
to African American students. Extinguishing the relevant association through
application of the Selective Manipulator removes this pedagogically significant
opportunity.
Even Sally Haslanger, who cautions against expending too many philosophical
resources on the discussion of the cognitive aspects of bias, points out that
“drawing attention to implicit bias can be strategically useful as a starting point
for discussion of social injustice because there is empirical evidence to support
the claim that we are all biased.”58 But with the Selective Manipulator, the
opportunity for discussion does not necessarily arise, and so we miss out on
discussing important structural issues.
This potential outcome does not require that we forgo any use of the Selective
Manipulator — it still might be the most effective method for preventing the dis-
torted cognitions that thwart educational goals, as discussed in 2.2. But we should
act to preserve the opportunity to turn attention to unjust structures that freely
accompanies traditional implicit bias interventions. In order to preserve these ped-
agogically important opportunities, I propose that the Selective Manipulator be
designed such that it both requires users to confront the content of their biases,
as well as how they have figured in cognition, and simultaneously provides them
with information about the wider social and historical context, inviting them to
engage with it and consider how it relates to their biases.
One might think that this suggestion is motivated by egalitarian concerns
rather than by epistemic concerns; however, greater attention to the structures
that reinforce implicit social biases not only works toward egalitarian goals, but
also facilitates achieving the epistemic goals discussed in 2.2, in turn promot-
ing better teaching and learning. If we wish to see progress in various fields of
knowledge acquisition and dissemination, we should not erroneously discount
the scholarly contributions of people who do not fit the social stereotype asso-
ciated with a particular field of knowledge. Structural barriers at the heart of
mirror theorists’ concerns also create barriers to development in the field of
knowledge. Amia Srinivasan has argued forcefully for this point regarding progress
57. Howard, “Who Really Cares?”
58. Haslanger, “Social Structure, Narrative, and Explanation,” 12.
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in philosophy, for instance. She maintains that all philosophy is value-laden.59
Even in logic and proof theory, we appeal to values such as simplicity and ele-
gance, for instance. Moreover, which values are designated as desirable within
a discipline is in part a matter of cultural and historical standards. According to
Srinivasan,
once we recognise that the outputs of our philosophical theorising are radically shaped by
how, where and with whom we are thrown into the world, then we will see the philosophical
pressure to diversify philosophy. A homogenous discipline means a homogenous set of ideas,
a homogenous set of intellectual products and projects. If our goal is to collectively explore
logical space, collectively seek the truth, then a genealogically homogenous search party won’t
be particularly good at the job.60
In other words, disallowing people to participate in pursuing and extending knowl-
edge acquisition on the basis that they do not fit the dominant social stereotype of
that discipline is not a neutral action as regards progress in that discipline. Scholars
who have homogenous social and cultural experiences may advance their disci-
pline in fewer directions than a more heterogeneous workforce.61
One may think that this is only true in select subjects — science is not
value-laden, for instance, or so the reply goes. But that isn’t so clearly true. Even in
scientific disciplines, scholars make decisions about which phenomena are worthy
of scientific investigation; which discoveries are worthy of acknowledgment and
attention in the standardized canon; and which examples from the canon are
taught. For example, in medicine, a historically male discipline, the contemporary
research agenda still proceeds along a gendered trajectory.62 The sciences are
disciplines that purport to offer comprehensive models of reality, not reality as
modeled from the perspective of some subset of society, and so diverse experiences
are integral to setting the course for how, and into what, scientific inquiry
proceeds. As such, from an epistemic perspective (as well as from a moral one), we
ought to be aware of and interested in dismantling the structures that perpetuate
marginalization and prevent diversification in places of research, teaching, and
learning.
59. Amia Srinivasan, “Does Feminist Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” (keynote address presented at the
King’s College LondonMinorities and PhilosophyConference, July 4, 2015); transcript available at http://
users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Research_files/Does%20Feminist%20Philosophy_KCL%20talk.pdf
60. Ibid.
61. It is worth clarifying that Srinivasan’s view is not relativism about accurate understanding of
the world, but rather that our epistemological project to achieve accurate understanding is more
effectively served when it draws on the participation of people with different experiential starting
points.
62. For instance, there is a significant lack of research into endometriosis, as well as into uterine
fibroids — both gynecological conditions — compared to other diseases with similarly debilitating
symptoms. See Geoffrey Adamson et al., “Creating Solutions in Endometriosis: Global Collaboration
through the World Endometriosis Research Foundation,” Journal of Endometriosis 2, no. 1 (2010): 3–6;
and L. Amanti et al., “Uterine Leiomyoma and Its Association with Menstrual Pattern and History of
Depo-Medroxyprogesterone Acetate Injections,” International Journal of General Medicine 4 (2011):
535–538.
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Conclusion
In the foregoing, I argued that because cognitive biases bring about dis-
torted cognitions, they thwart goals of knowledge acquisition and dissemination,
and therefore educators have a strong interest in their mitigation. Future techno-
logical interventions have the potential to enhance biasmitigation. I argued that an
intervention that halts the processes that lead to distorted cognitions, the Heuris-
tic Terminator, will not serve to facilitate knowledge acquisition because heuristic
processes often result in accurate cognitions, and without them we would find
it very difficult to make sense of decision environments. For this reason, a more
targeted approach, the Selective Manipulator, was favored; it works by erasing par-
ticular associations that lead to distorted cognitions.
I defended the use of the Selective Manipulator against a challenge from the
mirror view, but argued that we should take seriously the idea that structural bar-
riers to participation are worthy of our attention and showed how they can hinder
the progression of knowledge expansion and dissemination. Since moral and epis-
temic aims converge on engendering an understanding of structural injustice, use
of the Selective Manipulator presents an opportunity to host a public conversation
about the origins of the relevant biases in the unjust structures that they also act
to uphold. Accordingly, if the Selective Manipulator is to be used for the purpose
of facilitating those epistemic goals discussed in 2.2, we ought to ensure that we
preserve the opportunity for understanding structural injustices.
The discussion here has focused mostly on social biases, but there is a broader
lesson. Technological interventions such as direct neural manipulation take us
out of a more organic learning environment where inquiry can take any number
of tangents and allow one to make new discoveries that in turn lead to epistemic
progression. When future technological interventions promise cognitive shortcuts,
they may serve to facilitate specific epistemic goals. But we should also consider
what we might have learned if we had gone the long way around and, if necessary,
factor this into our use of the technological intervention.
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